Sahel Invades Yorùbáland: En route to Litoral West Africa
Fulani Bandits/Militia Groups use the vast areas of Niger State as a launchpad for their operations as they advance southward, invading the northern flank of Yorùbáland and opening new operating front
Genesis
The history of banditry in the North-West spans several decades, nearly a century, but the most recent rise is distinct, widespread, and more violent. The Federal Government Administration under President Buhari was when it all began. Originally transhuman cattle herders, Fulani gangs primarily formed into militia groups and besieged Hausa communities, particularly those in remote rural areas with challenging terrain. They used motorcycles in a swamp tactic, murdering hundreds of people and kidnapping many for ransom.
Communities that do not pay taxes run the risk of being destroyed or massacred and having their access to farms curtailed. They also impose levies on farming communities. Conflicts between Fulani traditional herders and Hausa traditional farmers were the beginning of the most recent banditry upsurge in the Northwest.
Numerous Fulani herders said that they were marginalised by Hausa communities, state governments, and even the Nigerian government.
They also claimed that they were subjected to discrimination and that they were forced to continue using their antiquated herding methods.
In the middle of cooperation for shared interests and advantages, these bandits developed into rival organisations. They are territorial and engage in conflict over territory, and they may already be connected to the Global Jihadi Operation Network.
It is challenging to determine their degree of involvement with the expanding Religious Ideologically Driven Militant Groups in the Sahel, such as JNIM, ANSARU, BH, ISGS/ISIL/ISWAP/IEGS, particularly when it is unclear whether they enforce Shari’a law in areas under their control and influence or whether they engage in Dawah in those areas.
Economy of Banditry
In the precolonial era of West Africa and the Sahel, modern bandits would have preferred to trade their kidnapped hostages for European muskets, gum, drugs, clothing, umbrellas, and other European items. The introduction of currency notes and the global shift away from slavery, however, have altered that. In order to buy, smuggle, finance logistics, and meet other demands of these bandit groups, ransoms are paid, raised by families, individuals, and towns, and are paid per capita.
There is a need to expand the banditry frontier of operations because the long-term banditry operations and Nigeria’s economic slump may have reduced the communities’ cash, or what I refer to as the “Ransom pool.”
The NEW Banditry Frontier - Western Nigeria or Yorùbáland
It goes without saying that Yorùbáland, which stretches from the northeastern bank of Lokoja to the western coast, from the border town of Jebba in Kwara State to Akoko to the Ilaje Coast, is the most economically viable, geopolitically, and culturally homogeneous sub-region of Nigeria and, in fact, of West Africa.
Why Frontier’s first choice, Èkìtì, didn’t work out and why Kwara State chose it instead
Kogi West (Okunland), which is next to Èkìtì State, Akoko in Ondo State, and Kwara State, is where the banditry in Yorùbáland began. Three prominent Ọba in Èkìtì State were ambushed a few years ago; two of them were slain and the third managed to flee.
Residents of Èkìtì communities were being kidnapped, and farmers were being murdered on their land.
However, after their first failure, bandit groups might have modified their infiltration strategies through Èkìtì because of the state government’s prompt response and military intervention.
Their shortcomings, however, would be influenced by geography; Èkìtì is a heavily hilly region with connected towns, communities, and villages.
The development of the typical swamp technique, which involved a huge number of motorcycles and logistics supplies, would have been hindered by the hilly terrain. The Savannah grasslands and plain terrains of Kogi West and Kwara State are primarily comparable to those of North-West bandits, allowing for the movement of logistics.
New strategies would include re-establishing contact with bandits in Kogi West via the Kwara-Kogi borders and maintaining the Banditry Frontier in Kogi West while establishing a new Banditry Frontier in Kwara State via the Niger route.
In order to establish a seamless supply and route, as well as reinforcements for both sides, bandit groups in Niger and Kwara States may be attempting to establish connections with those in Kogi West, which shares a continuous border with Kwara South.
Bandits and their associates find it financially advantageous to operate in this economic hotspot. new money, a new economy, a new random pool, and one that is much bigger than Northeastern. For bandit organisations looking to fund their weapon stockpiles through ransomware, the new frontier means a new economy.
New Frontline to overwhelm and Overstretch the Nigerian Military
Internal security is more of a burden for the Nigerian military than exterior security. In the past ten years, it has sent thousands of its troops to fight the Boko-haram and ISWAP insurgencies in the northeast. More recently, it has sent thousands to fight banditry in the northwest.
After learning of the military’s limits, these bandit organisations tried to stretch the Nigerian military to the limit by enlarging and broadening the Frontline. Additionally, bandit groups are decentralised, with a central command that is frequently held by the group’s leader. All bandit organisations are not under the control of a single central leadership.
Attitudes of The Nigerian State
One of the main reasons why the Nigerian government tolerates banditry is that it does not see it as a danger to Nigeria’s territorial integrity because bandits lack the religious ideology to build an Islamic state and secessionist tendencies. It won’t be taken seriously by the Nigerian government until Bandit groups have been connected to the networks and goals of Global Jihadi. The Nigerian State’s response is not motivated by the country’s residents’ deaths, violence, or sense of insecurity. Because of these factors, the Nigerian military appears to be diplomatic and kind with bandit organisations in the North-West; this would not be the case in the South.
Due to the high prevalence of secessionist aspirations in the South, homegrown militancy or non-state actors in Southern Nigeria are frequently given priority, and the Nigerian military’s response is frequently more forceful, violent, and deterrent—much like military expeditions to an empire’s tributary states. We can conclude that the Nigerian state’s response, which ranges from mild to caustic, is determined by the following: The site or focal point of insecurity, non-state actors, militants, secessionist sentiments, or ideologically motivated militancy.
However, expanding bandit groups from the North-West would also be more prepared and resilient, fully aware that, in contrast to the governments of the North West, the governments of Kwara, Kogi, and the South West would probably not engage in negotiations, call for a truce, or make a deal. Bandits who are apprehended in Kwara, Kogi States, and the South-West Geopolitical region would probably be subject to the law or killed during kinetic activity. It will either be killed or be killed, according to the bandits.
Historical Significance
Similar to how the Sahel (Gwandu Emirate) used Ilorin as a launchpad in the 19th century, they aimed to extend their operations, power, and territory southward following the fall of Old Òyó. But this attempt was crushed by Ibadan, the successor state of Old Òyó, and the Yorùbá Civil Wars that followed made it much simpler and prepared the way for British colonisation of Yorùbáland, which led to the creation of Southern Nigeria in 1906 and Nigeria in 1914, respectively.
Significance to Yorùbáland
Beyond its historical and cultural significance, Yorùbáland’s banditry operations have already caused a mass exodus of people and caused refugee problems in Kogi West and Kwara State. The extension of these operations is expected to cause further economic, social, and cultural stumbling blocks. Conditions will be comparable to those during the War.
Way forward
State Governments’ approved and supported Emergency Security Conference should be announced
Representatives of Kogi and Kwara States Government or Kogi and Kwara States Government should be involved and carried along
Kwara and Kogi West should be Fully Militarized, with Military FOB set up in strategic locations e.g Kogi-Kwara Border, Kwara-Niger border, Kwara-Oyo border and Kwara-Ekiti border
Swift codification of State Policing in Nigeria and its Implementation
Deployment of Unmanned Surveillance Systems and drones in Kwara and Kogi States
Arming Local Vigilantes, OPC and other Community Militia groups
Government’s Presence in Kogi West and Kwara States beyond State Capitals.
Can you comment on how this conflict has been exacerbated by the carving up of Africa in the mid 1800s. That carving knife severed coherence across many cultures who wanted to live in relative peace. Am I misguided?